The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, also called the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, or the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, was the effect of a series of missile tests conducted by the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the waters surrounding Taiwan, including the Taiwan Strait, from 21 July 1995 to 23 March 1996. The first set of missiles fired in mid-to-late 1995 was allegedly intended to send a strong signal to the Republic of China government under PresidentLee Teng-hui, who had been seen as "moving its foreign policy away from the One-China policy", as claimed by PRC.[1] The second set of missiles was fired in early 1996, allegedly intending to intimidate the Taiwanese electorate in the run-up to the 1996 presidential election.
The crisis began when President Lee Teng-hui accepted an invitation from his alma mater, Cornell University, to deliver a speech on "Taiwan's Democratization Experience". Seeking to diplomatically isolate the Republic of China, the PRC opposed such visits by ROC (Taiwanese) leaders. A year earlier, in 1994, when President Lee's plane had stopped in Honolulu to refuel after a trip to South America, the U.S. government under President Bill Clinton refused Lee's request for a visa. Lee had been confined to the military airfield where he landed, forcing him to spend a night on his plane. A U.S. State Department official called the situation "embarrassing" and Lee complained that he was being treated as a second-class leader.
After Lee had decided to visit Cornell, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher assured PRC Foreign MinisterQian Qichen that a visa for Lee would be "inconsistent with [the U.S.'s] unofficial relationship [with Taiwan]." However, the humiliation from Lee's last visit caught the attention of many pro-Taiwan figures in the U.S. and this time, the United States Congress acted on Lee's behalf. In May 1995, a concurrent resolution asking the State Department to allow Lee to visit the U.S. passed the House on 2 May with a vote of 396 to 0 (with 38 not voting), and the Senate on 9 May with a vote of 97 to 1 (with 2 not voting).[2] The State Department relented on 22 May 1995. Lee spent 9–10 June 1995 in the U.S. at a Cornell alumni reunion.[1]
The United States had not prepared the People's Republic of China for its policy reversal in granting a visa.[3]: 224 While in the United States, Lee stated, "Taiwan is a country with independent sovereignty.[4]: 11 PRC leadership described Lee's moves as an effort to "split the motherland".[5]
On 7 July 1995, the PRC responded: the Xinhua News Agency announced missile tests would be conducted by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and argued that this attitude would endanger the peace and safety of the region. At the same time, the PRC mobilized forces in Fujian. In the later part of July and early August, numerous commentaries were published by Xinhua and the People's Daily condemning Lee and his cross-strait policies.[citation needed]
From 21 July to 28 July, the Second Artillery Corps (SAC) conducted a round of missile launches in an area 36 miles north of Taiwan.[6]: 267 On 21 July, it launched two Dongfeng-15 missiles approximately 70 nautical miles from the coast of Taiwan.[6]: 267 On 22 July, SAC fired two missiles at an area 40 miles north of Taiwan.[6]: 267–268 On 24 July, it fired two more at the same area.[6]: 268 Simultaneously, the PRC concentrated naval and amphibious landing forces in the area of the strait and conducted military exercises.[6]: 268
The United States responded by sending two aircraft carrier groups to the vicinity of Taiwan.[3]: 224 In July 1995, USS Belleau Wood (LHA-3) transited the Taiwan Strait.[7]
Between January and February 1996, the PRC concentrated 100,000 troops along the strait and conducted large scale exercises.[6]: 268 Tensions remained high in early 1996 as Taiwan prepared for its first presidential election and Lee Teng-hui ran on the Kuomintang's ticket.[6]: 268
On 8 March, the PRC fired more missiles 20 miles off Keelung and 29 miles off Kaohsiung.[6]: 268 Over 70 percent of commercial shipping passed through the targeted ports, which were disrupted by the proximity of the tests.[8][9]
The same day, United States President Clinton announced that the USS Independence CV-62 and her Carrier Battlegroup (Carrier Group Five),[10] returning to Japan from its visit to the Philippines, would deploy to international waters near Taiwan.[11] According to the Washington Post, that same day; the USS Bunker Hill CG-52 (which had detached from the Independence Battlegroup) along with a RC-135 Intelligence aircraft monitored the launch of 3 CSS-6 (DF-15) missiles from the PRC, two of them into shipping lanes near Kaohsiung and one fired directly over Taipei into a shipping lane near Keelung.[12]
On the following day, the PRC announced live-fire exercises to be conducted near Penghu from 12 to 20 March. On 11 March, the U.S. dispatched USS Nimitz CVN-68 and her battlegroup, Carrier Group Seven.[13][6]: 268 Nimitz and her battle group, along with Belleau Wood, sailed through the Taiwan Strait, while Independence did not.[14][15] In response to the U.S. moves, the PRC announced further exercises.[6]: 268
From 18 March to 25 March, the PRC conducted military exercises involving airplanes, guided missile destroyers, submarines, and 150,000 troops at Pingtan Island.[6]: 268–269 The exercises practiced amphibious landing, mountainous assaults, and included paratrooper exercises.[6]: 269
On March 23, 1996, Lee was elected Taiwan's president.[6]: 269
Jiang ordered the PLA to begin a ten-year modernization program.[3]: 225 Soon the People's Republic ordered Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia, a Cold War-era class designed to counter U.S. Navy carrier battle groups, allegedly in mid-December 1996 during the visit to Moscow by Chinese Premier Li Peng. The PRC subsequently ordered modern attack submarines (Kilo class) and warplanes (76 Su-30MKK and 24 Su-30MK2) to counter the U.S. Navy's carrier groups.[citation needed]
The PRC's attempts at intimidation were counterproductive. Arousing more anger than fear, it boosted Lee by 5% in the polls, earning him a majority as opposed to a mere plurality.[16] The military tests and exercises also strengthened the argument for further U.S. arms sales to the ROC and led to the strengthening of military ties between the U.S. and Japan, increasing the role Japan would play in defending Taiwan.
During the military exercises in March, there were preoccupations in Taiwan that the PRC would occupy some small islands controlled by Taiwan, causing panic among many citizens. Therefore, many flights from Taiwan to the United States and Canada were full.[citation needed] The most likely target was Wuqiu (Wuchiu), then garrisoned by 500 soldiers. The outlying islands were placed on high alert.[17] The then secretary general of the National Security Council of Taiwan, Ting Mao-shih, flew to New York to meet Samuel Berger, Deputy National Security Advisor of the United States.[18]
In 1999, Major GeneralLiu Liankun, a top Chinese military logistics officer, and his subordinate Senior Colonel Shao Zhengzhong were arrested, court-martialed and executed for disclosing to Taiwan that the missiles had unarmed warheads despite the Chinese government's claims.[19]
The four vertices (red) (23°13′N 122°20′E, 25°13′N 122°40′E, 24°57′N 122°40′E, 24°57′N 122°20′E) of the announced quadrilateral area reserved for the military exercise off Keelung (orange) between 8 and 15 March 1996.[20]
The four vertices (red) (22°38′N 119°25′E, 22°38′N 119°45′E, 22°22′N 119°45′E, 22°22′N 119°25′E) of the announced quadrilateral area reserved for the military exercise off Kaohsiung (orange) between 8 and 15 March 1996.[20]
The four vertices (red) (23°57′N 118°06′E, 23°25′N 118°50′E, 22°30′N 117°30′E, 23°01′N 116°46′E) of the announced quadrilateral area reserved for the military exercise between 12 and 20 March 1996.[21]
The four vertices (red) (25°50′N 119°50′E, 25°32′N 120°24′E, 24°54′N 119°56′E, 25°12′N 119°26′E) of the announced quadrilateral area reserved for the military exercise between 18 and 25 March 1996.[22]
According to Sankei Shimbun series "Secret Records on Lee Teng-hui" dated 1 April 2019, Tseng Yong-hsien, Lee's National Policy Adviser, received a direct message from China official in early July 1995; "Our ballistic missiles will be launched toward Taiwan a couple of weeks later, but you guys don't have to worry." This was communicated to Lee soon after, to prevent escalation. Tseng, as an envoy of Lee, had met President Yang Shangkun in 1992 and had a secret connection with Ye Xuanning, Head of the Liaison Department of the PLA.[31]
^Zhao, Suisheng (2024). "Is Beijing's Long Game on Taiwan about to End? Peaceful Unification, Brinksmanship, and Military Takeover". In Zhao, Suisheng (ed.). The Taiwan Question in Xi Jinping's Era: Beijing's Evolving Taiwan Policy and Taiwan's Internal and External Dynamics. London and New York: Routledge. ISBN9781032861661.
^Denny Roy. Taiwan: A Political History. Cornell University Press, 2003. p. 197. ISBN9780801488054
^ abcdefghijklmnLi, Xiaobing (2024). "Beijing's Military Power and East Asian-Pacific Hot Spots". In Fang, Qiang; Li, Xiaobing (eds.). China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment. Leiden University Press. ISBN9789087284411.
^"Report: China expected to attack island". The Times-News. 25 February 1996. p. C6. The most likely target would be Wuchiu, above five miles off the eastern coast of China, the report said. The island has a garrison of 500 soldiers. To prepare for an attack, outlying islands have been placed on high alert, it said.
^Xin, Qiang (2009). "迈向"准军事同盟"：美台安全合作的深化与升级（1995~2008）" [Moving toward a "Quasi-Military Alliance": The Deepening and Upgrading of US–Taiwan Security Cooperation (1995–2008)]. American Studies Quarterly (in Chinese) (4). Archived from the original on 4 June 2013. Retrieved 5 January 2013.
^ ab硝烟滚滚震慑"台独"——东南沿海演习始末(下) [Gunpowder smoke deters "Taiwanese independence" — the beginning and end of the southeast coastal exercise (part 2)] (in Chinese). China Central Television. Archived from the original on 23 September 2015. Retrieved 26 July 2019.
^1996年3月20日 中国人民解放军在东海和南海进行海空实弹演习 [20 March 1996: The Chinese People's Liberation Army conducts sea and air live ammunition exercises in the East China Sea and the South China Sea]. people.com.cn (in Chinese). 19 March 2009. Archived from the original on 30 June 2010. Retrieved 17 December 2014.
^"zh:1996年3月18日 中国人民解放军在台湾海峡进行陆海空联合演习" [18 March 1996: The Chinese People's Liberation Army conducts joint land, sea and air exercises in the Taiwan Strait]. people.com.cn (in Chinese). 16 March 2009. Archived from the original on 22 May 2013. Retrieved 17 December 2014.
Ross, Robert S. (2000). "The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility and the Use of Force". International Security. 25 (2): 87–123. doi:10.1162/016228800560462. JSTOR2626754. S2CID57560261.—This article traces in detail the course of the crisis and analyzes the state of Sino-American relations both before and after the crisis.
Shirk, Susan (2007). China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise. Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0-19-530609-5.
Republic of China
United States (naval support)
People's Republic of China
Zhang Wannian
People's Liberation Army
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